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V.

ROBBIE MICHAEL MACDONALD
Defendant/Appellee

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

****
JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to the provisions of
Utah Code § 78A-3- l 02( 4).

ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

injuring G.B., an infant. The State presents two issues on interlocutory appeal. The first
issue is whether the trial court erred in suppressing two police interviews of MacDonald
for failure to properly administer Miranda warnings. "A trial court's ruling on a motion
to suppress is reviewed for c01Tcctncss, including its application of the law to the facts."

State v. Tripp, 2010 UT 9,

il

23, 227 P.3d 1251. "The trial court's underlying factual

findings are reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard." Id.
The second issue is whether the trial court erred in excluding evidence offered by
the State under Utah R. Evid. 404(b ). Specifically, the State challenges the trial court's

exclusion of evidence that MacDonald called G.B. a "whiner," MacDonald "flipped off''
G.B., MacDonald often yelled at G.B., MacDonald previously mistreated G.B., and
MacDonald was jealous of G.B. A trial court's decision to exclude evidence under rule
404(b) is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Widdison, 200 I UT 60,

if 42,

28

P.3d 1278.
CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Utah R. Evid. 404(b) is attached hereto in the addenda.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case
The State has charged Defendant/Appellee Robbie Michael MacDonald with child

abuse and obstruction of justice. The alleged victim is G.B., an infant. The case has not
yet been tried.
On interlocutory appeal, the State challenges two decisions of the trial court. In
the first decision, the trial court excluded two police interviews of MacDonald for failure
to properly administer Miranda warnings. In the second decision, the trial court excluded
evidence the State sought to admit under Utah R. Evid. 404(b ): specifically, evidence that
MacDonald called G.B. a "whiner," MacDonald "flipped off' G.B., MacDonald often
yelled at G.B., MacDonald previously mistreated G.B., and MacDonald was jealous of
G.B.
B.

Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition
Robbie Michael MacDonald was charged by criminal information filed February

7, 2013, with Count I -- child abuse, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code §

2

76-5-109(2)(a); and Count 2 -- false written statement, a class A misdemeanor, in
violation of Utah Code § 76-8-504.5. R. 4-3. At a preliminary hearing on June 24, 2013,
the trial court found probable cause and bound both counts over for trial.

R. 57-56.

Count 2 was subsequently amended on January 7, 2015 to obstructing justice, a third
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code § 76-8-306( 1). R. 1073-1071.
During the investigation of the case, MacDonald was interviewed at the police
station three times: January 18, 2013, January 23, 2013, and January 24, 2013.
MacDonald filed a motion to suppress statements he made during the last two out of
these interviews. R. 293-286. After briefing and argument, in a ruling dated February 5,
2015, the trial court suppressed the first two of these interviews. R. 1152-1143. The trial
court did not suppress the third interview. R. 1 144.
In anticipation of trial, the State moved to admit various pieces of evidence under
Utah R. Evid. 404(b). R. 73-64; 961-953. After briefing and argument, in a ruling dated
February 17, 2015, the trial court admitted some of the 404(b) evidence but excluded
evidence that MacDonald yelled at G .B. and another child in the home, MacDonald
called G.B. a whiner, MacDonald "flipped ofr• G.B., MacDonald was jealous of G.B.,
and MacDonald previously physically mistreated G.B. R. 1178-1162.
This interlocutory appeal followed.
interlocutory appeal on April 21, 2015.

This Court granted the State's petition for
R. 1189.

The trial court granted a stay of

proceedings March 3, 2015. R. 1185.

ST ATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
The trial com1 made findings of fact with respect to each of the two police

3

interviews it suppressed. The trial court also made separate findings of fact regarding the
404(b) evidence.

a.

First police interview.
With respect to the interview on January 18, 2013, the trial court found that on

January 18, 2013, in American Fork, Utah, a 911 call was made regarding G.B., a 10month-old, who was not breathing. R. 1151. At the time of the call, MacDonald was
taking care of G.B. R. 1151. G.B. was MacDonald's girlfriend's son. R. 1151.
That same day, after paramedics transported G.B. to the hospital, a Detective
Christensen interviewed MacDonald at his home. R. 115 I. After this initial interview,
Detective Ryan Metcalf transported MacDonald to the American Fork police station for
further questioning. R. 1151.
At the police station, Detective Metcalf interviewed MacDonald about the events
leading up to G.B.'s injuries. R. 115 I. During the interview, the door to the interview
room was closed but not locked.

R. 1151.

Detective Metcalf was the only person,

besides MacDonald, in the interview room. R. 1151. The interview was audio and video
recorded. R. 1151.
During the interview, MacDonald stated that G.B. had fallen asleep on the living
room floor. R. 1151. MacDonald picked him up and laid him down in his crib. R. 1151.
When MacDonald later checked on G.B., G.B. was unresponsive, not breathing, and had
vomit on his mouth. R. 1151. MacDonald stated he yelled for his roommate to help. R.
115 I. The roommate called 9 I I and began CPR. R. 1151. Paramedics later arrived,
continued resuscitation efforts, and transported G.B. to American Fork Hospital.

4

R.

1151.

At the conclusion of the interview, MacDonald was not arrested and a police

officer transported MacDonald back to MacDonald's residence. R. 1150.
The trial court found that the tone of this interview was accusatory, and that
Detective Metcalfs line of questioning implied that MacDonald had done something
wrong. R. 1150. The trial court found that MacDonald was left alone in the interview
room for approximately 40 minutes during the course of the interview. R. 1150.
With regard to Miranda warnings, the trial court found that Detective Metcalf read
the A1iranda warnings to MacDonald, but found that Detective Metcalf did not ask
MacDonald whether he waived those rights.

R. 1150.

The Court further found that

Detective Metcalf said he wasn't sure that MacDonald "needed his rights to be read to
him." R. 1150.

b.

Second police interview.
With respect to the interview on January 23~ 2013~ the trial court found that

MacDonald's grandfather drove MacDonald to the American Fork police station.

R.

1149. This time, MacDonald was interviewed by Sergeant Gregg Ludlow. R. 1148. The
door to the interview room was again closed, but not locked. R. 1148. This interview
was also audio and video recorded. R. 1148.
During this second interview, MacDonald stated that while carrying G.B. to his
crib, MacDonald tripped on a rug and G.B. fell from his anns. R. 1148. G.B.'s head hit
the cement flooring. R. 1148. MacDonald then comforted G.B. and laid G.B. down in
the crib. R. 1148. After the interview, MacDonald was not an-ested and was permitted to
leave the police station with his grandfather. R. 1148.
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The trial court found that the questioning during this second interview was also
accusatory.

R. 1148.

The trial court found that Sergeant Ludlow stated during the

interview that "everything was pointing at [MacDonald]" and that "there was more to
[MacDonald's] version of events."

R. I 148.

Sergeant Ludlow also stated that

MacDonald was being "deceitful," and expressed during the interview that he did not
believe MacDonald's story. R. 1148.
With regard to Miranda warnings, the trial court found that Sergeant Ludlow
asked MacDonald if he remembered when Detective Metcalf "brought you in [and]
talked to you about your rights and all that stuff? Do you remember all that stuff, right?"
R. 1147. The trial court found that MacDonald nodded in the affirmative, and Sergeant
Ludlow then proceeded to interview him.

R. 1147.

Sergeant Ludlow did not ask

MacDonald whether he was willing to speak with police. R. 1147. The trial court found
that Sergeant Ludlow did not give an express Miranda warning to MacDonald. R. 1147.
However, the trial court found that at the conclusion of the verbal interview, MacDonald
provided a signed written statement that included the Miranda warning. R. 1147.

c.

404(b) evidence.
With respect to the excluded 404(b) evidence, the trial court made factual findings

based on the testimony of Addie Loveridge, G.B.'s mother, at an evidentiary hearing on
January 20, 20 I 5.
The trial court found that G.B.'s mother, Addie Loveridge, met MacDonald in June
or July 2012. R. 1177. Loveridge introduced MacDonald to G.B. in July 2012. R. 1177.
Loveridge brought G .B. to MacDonald's grandparents' home for "play dates" with
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MacDonald's daughter, K.M. R. 1176. These play dates occuned almost every other day
for 4-5 months. R. 1176. During this period of time, MacDonald commented five or six
times that G.B. was slow to develop, and that he should be crawling and eating. R. 1176.
Loveridge noticed that MacDonald did not like to be touched by G.B. and that he would
not stop K.M. from pushing or hitting G.B. R. 1176.
In late 2012, Loveridge and MacDonald decided to move in together to "work on
being a better family." R. 1176. A mutual friend needed a roommate so Loveridge and
MacDonald decided to move into the basement of the friend's home. R. 1176. They
moved in during the first week of December 2012. R. 1176.
At the time Loveridge and MacDonald moved in together, Loveridge had been
working on Fridays, Saturdays, and Sundays for a total of approximately 20 hours per
week.

R. 1176.

As Christmas approached, Loveridge took advantage of overtime

opportunities and worked 30 hours per week. R. 1176. MacDonald was not yet enrolled
in school, and was home 80% of the time. R. 1176.
Loveridge traveled to San Diego, California, for Christmas that year.

R. 1175.

She spent seven days in California and returned before New Year's Day. R. 1175. From
the date Loveridge and MacDonald moved in together until Loveridge left for San Diego,
MacDonald was with G.B. every day. R. 1175. During that period, Loveridge observed
several things that concerned her.

First, MacDonald commented that G.B.'s "eyes are

crossed" and that "his penis is very small." R. 1175. Second, MacDonald did not stop
K.M. from hitting G.B. R. 1175. Third, MacDonald picked up G.B. by the arms, carried
him across the room, and "plopped him down" on a beanbag chair. R. 1175. Loveridge
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felt that this was "too rough for my liking" and knew that it hurt G.B. because G.B. was
crying. R. 1175. Finally, neither G.B. or K.M. was allowed in the bed that Loveridge
and MacDonald shared. R. 1175. Loveridge was required to breastfeed G.B. in G.B.'s
room. R. 1175.
After Loveridge returned from San Diego, she asked MacDonald to administer
cold medicine to G.B.

R. 1174.

Afterward, she observed bruises on both of G.B.'s

cheeks. R. 1174. She asked MacDonald about it, and MacDonald told her that G.B. had
fallen on a toy. R. 1174. Also, on another occasion, Loveridge observed that MacDonald
"flipped off' G.B. R. 1174. Loveridge witnessed this through a reflection in a fish tank.
R. 1174.

The trial court also found several examples of bad parenting, including that
MacDonald left both children unchanged, resulting in them being covered in feces; that
MacDonald would not feed G.B. when he was hungry, or at least would feed K.M. first;
and that MacDonald yelled constantly and excessively. R. 1173. Finally, the trial court
found that Defendant did not like G.B. clinging to Loveridge; encouraged Loveridge to
leave the room and let G.B. "cry it out''; pulled G.B. away from Loveridge; encouraged
Loveridge to get G.B.'s father to take G.B. for parent time; and wanted to have time with
just Loveridge and K.M. R. 1173.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

The State presents two issues on appeal. First, the State challenges the trial court's
ruling suppressing MacDonald's first two police interviews. The State argues that the
trial court erred because I) MacDonald was not in custody during either of these
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interviews, making the administration of lvfiranda warnmgs unnecessary; 2) even if
MacDonald was m custody and A1iranda warnings were required, MacDonald was
properly advised of Miranda before the second interview; and 3) MacDonald validly
waived his Miranda rights before speaking with the interviewing officers.

See Br. of

Appellant, 19-20.
The State's argument on this issue fails for three reasons. First, the State appears
to challenge the trial court's findings of fact, but did not preserve any such challenge at
the trial court. Second, even if the State preserved a challenge to the findings of fact, the
trial court's findings of fact are not clearly erroneous.

Third, the trial court correctly

applied the law to its findings of fact to conclude that MacDonald was in custody during
the two suppressed interviews, that Miranda warnings were not properly administered,
and that MacDonald did not validly waive his Miranda rights.
The second issue presented by the State is a challenge to the trial court's ruling
excluding the 404(b) evidence. The State argues that the 404(b) evidence was relevant to
establish MacDonald's motive for injuring G.B., and to rebut MacDonald's claim that
G.B. was hurt by accident. The State also argues that the probative value of this evidence
is not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, principally because the
State guesses that a jury would be more inflamed against MacDonald by the admitted
evidence than it would be by the excluded evidence.
The State's argument on this second issue also fails to demonstrate any error in the
trial court's ruling. The trial court scrupulously examined the 404(b) evidence, and the
trial court's findings of fact support its conclusions that the evidence was not admissible
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because it lacked a proper non-character purpose. Furthermore, the evidence was not
admissible under Utah R. Evid. 403 because the danger of unfair prejudice substantially
outweighed any marginal probative value.

ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN SUPPRESSING MACDONALD'S
TWO INTERVIEWS WITH POLICE.
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution ensures a privilege against

self-incrimination for all citizens: "No person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case
to be a witness against himself." U.S. Const. amend. V. In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 ( 1966), the United States Supreme Court gave effect
to this privilege when it held that, in criminal cases, "the prosecution may not use
statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of
the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure
the privilege against self-incrimination." 384 U.S. at 444. These procedural safeguards
take the form of what have come to be known as Miranda warnings: "Prior to any
questioning, the person must be warned that he has the right to remain silent, that any
statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has the right to
the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed." Id.
In this case, the State argues that the trial court erred m suppressmg two of
MacDonald's police interviews for failure to properly administer Miranda warnings. The
State offers three grounds for effor: 1) MacDonald was not in custody during either of
these interviews, making the administration of Miranda warnings unnecessary; 2) even if
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MacDonald was in custody and Miranda warnings were required, MacDonald was
properly informed of his Miranda rights before the second interview; and 3) MacDonald
validly waived his Miranda rights before speaking with the interviewing officers. See Br.
of Appellant, 19-20; 22-38.
But the State's argument fails for three reasons.

First, the State appears to

challenge the trial court's findings of fact on appeal, but did not preserve any such
challenge at the trial court.

Second, even if the State preserved a challenge to the

findings of fact, the trial court's findings of fact are not clearly erroneous. Third, the trial
court correctly applied the law to the facts in determining that MacDonald was in custody
during the two suppressed interviews, and that MacDonald did not validly waive his
Miranda rights.
a.

The State failed to preserve a challenge to the trial court's findings of fact.

In its brief, the State's statement of facts is not taken from the trial court's findings
of fact. See Br. of Appellant, 8-14 (citations therein). Rather, the State's statement of
facts is taken from evidence presented at a hearing on August 29, 2014, which included
the testimony of Detective Ryan Metcalf, Lieutenant Sam Liddiard, and audiovisual
recordings of the three interviews with MacDonald. Id.; see R. 1201:3-26.
The State's argument thus includes a number of facts that were not found by the
trial court, and the State relies on these facts.

For example, the State relies on the

propositions that "MacDonald was never restrained or placed in handcuffs"; "the
detectives were unarmed and in plain clothes"; "MacDonald was never deprived of food
or water"; and "MacDonald had his cell phone with him during the second interview."

11

~

Br. of Appellant, 26-27.

None of these, or various other propositions offered by the

State, were findings of fact made by the trial court. See R. 1152-1146.
The State, therefore, essentially asks this Court to find the facts on appeal from the
transcript of the evidentiary hearing, rather than granting any deference to the trial court's
findings of fact. In so doing, the State forgets that the appeals courts in Utah review a
trial court's findings of fact for "clear eITor" because a trial court is in a better position to
judge credibility and resolve evidentiary conflicts. State v. Levin, 2006 UT 50, ,I 19, 144
P.3d 1096, 144 P.3d 1096; see also State v. Maestas, 2012 UT 46, ,I 193, 299 P.3d 892
("the trial court is in the best position to assess the credibility of the witnesses and derive
a sense of the proceeding as a whole, something an appellate court cannot hope to gamer
from a cold record").
Furthermore, where a party does not challenge a trial court's factual findings at the
trial court level, it waives any challenge to the trial court's factual findings on appeal. See

Holladay v. Storey, 2013 UT App 158,

~~

39-40, 307 P.3d 584 (regarding a challenge to

adequacy of factual findings, party "failed to preserve this issue for appeal because he did
not notify the trial court of these alleged inaccuracies"); Chang v. Soldier Summit

Development, 2003 UT App 415,

~

15, 82 P.3d 203 ("Because Plaintiffs do not challenge

the trial court's findings, and because we conclude that the trial court's legal
conclusions ... are [] legally sound and supported by unchallenged findings, Plaintiffs'
argument fails").
In this case, the State did not challenge the trial court's factual findings in regard to
the trial comi's decision to suppress the two interviews. It is true that the findings of fact
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were prepared by defense counsel.

R. 1206:2.

However, in the trial court the State

indicated that it took only one exception to those findings, in that it wanted the Court to
find that MacDonald returned to the police station for the second interview voluntarily.
R. 1206: 1-2. The Court declined to make this finding. Id.
1

Because the State failed to challenge the trial court s factual findings at the trial
court level, it has failed to preserve any challenge to the trial court's factual findings,
other than a challenge to the trial court's refusal to find that MacDonald did not return to
the police department voluntarily. See Kell v. State, 2012 UT 25, 285 P.3d 1133 (purpose
of the appellate preservation requirement is to "give the trial court an opportunity to
address the claimed error, and if appropriate, correct it"). This Com1 should, therefore,
review only the trial court's application of the law to the findings of fact that it made, and
should decline to consider other facts proffered by the State on appeal.
b.

The trial court's findings of fact are not clearlv erroneous.
Besides the State's invalid attempt to add to the trial court's findings of fact on

appeal, the State has not challenged the trial court's findings of fact as clearly erroneous.
Therefore, this Court should accept the trial court's findings of fact.

c.

The trial court's legal conclusions that MacDonald was in custody and that
Miranda warnings were not properly administered were correct.
Applying the law to the trial court's findings of fact demonstrates that the trial

court was correct in suppressing the first two of MacDonald's interviews.
address each of the State's arguments on this issue in tum.
1.

MacDonald was in custody during each of the suppressed interviews.
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We will

The State first argues that Miranda warnmgs were not required because
MacDonald was not in custody during either suppressed interview, and thus was not
subject to "custodial interrogation," a prerequisite to the command to administer Miranda
warnings. See Br. of Appellant, 22-28. The State acknowledges that the relevant standard
for detennining whether a person is in custody for Miranda purposes is whether, in light
of the objective circumstances of interrogation, a reasonable person would have felt he
was not at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave.

Howes v. Fields,
(2012).

U.S.

Br. of Appellant, 23; see

, 132S.Ct.1181, 1189, 182 L.Ed.2d 17, 80 U.S.L.W. 4154

However, contrary to the State's argument, the trial court's factual findings

support its conclusion that MacDonald was in custody.
The test for whether a person is in custody, set forth above, "is objective and
considers how a reasonable man in the suspect's position would have understood his
situation." Levin, 2006 UT 50 at

,r 35

(internal quotes omitted). Although this inquiry

can depend on many factors, "[n]o one factor is dispositive, and [appeals courts] look to
the totality of the circumstances in making [their] determination." State v. Maestas, 2012
UT App 53,

,r 50, 272 P.3d 769; see also Salt Lake City v.

Carner, 664 P.2d 1168, 1171

(Utah 1983) (listing factors that can aid in determining whether a person was in custody).
In conducting this totality-of-the-circumstances analysis, the trial court considered
factors that were relevant in the context of this case.

For example, the trial court

considered that "when investigatory questioning shifts to accusatory questioning, the
existence of custody is likely because this often indicates to the defendant that he or she
is not free to leave." See Levin, 2006 UT 50 at

14

,r 36.

The trial court found that both of

the suppressed interviews were accusatory in nature. R. 1150, 1148. The trial court also
found that, with respect to the first interview, 11 Detective Metcalf s line of questioning
implied that defendant did something wrong. 11 R. 1150. These two findings aided the
trial court's conclusion that MacDonald was in custody for both interviews.
The trial court also considered "whether the investigation focused on the accused, 11
and considered the Utah Supreme Court's admonition that "[p ]erhaps a heavy emphasis
on the factor of whether the investigation is focused on the accused is justified where
identity is the question," as it was in this case. See Carner, 664 P .2d at

i1

1171-1172.

The trial court found that during the second interview, "[MacDonald] was the focus of the
investigation." R. 1148. The trial court further found that during the second interview,
"Sergeant Ludlow stated that everything was pointing at [MacDonald] and that there was
more to [MacDonald's] version of events." R. 1148. These findings aided the trial court1s
conclusion that MacDonald was in custody for the second interview.
The trial court further considered "the site of the interrogation" as well as "the
length and form of interrogation." See Carner, 664 P .2d at ,11171-1172. The trial court
found that both interviews were conducted at the police station. R. 1151, 1149. The trial
court found that during both interviews, the doors to the interview rooms were closed
(but not locked). R. 1151, 1148. The trial court found that during the first interview,
MacDonald was left alone in the interview room for approximately forty minutes during
the course of the interview. R. 1150. And, as noted before, the trial court found that
during the interviews, the "questioning was accusatory," the "questioning implied that
defendant did something wrong," and that interrogators "stated that [MacDonald] was
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being deceitful" and continued "to express non-belief during the interrogation." R. 1150,
1148. These findings also aided the trial comt's legal conclusion that MacDonald was in
custody during both interviews.
MacDonald concedes that some of the trial court's findings of fact do not indicate
that MacDonald was in custody. For example, the trial court found that although the
interview room door was closed during both interviews, it was not locked during either
interview.

R. 1151, 1148.

The trial court also found that after the first interview,

MacDonald was not arrested and a police officer transported him back to his residence.
R. 1150. Nevertheless, under the totality of the circumstances, the trial court was correct
in concluding that MacDonald was in custody.
Perhaps the best way to analyze the custody issue is to do as the Utah Supreme
Court suggested in Levin, and "consider[] how a reasonable man in the suspect's position
would have understood his situation."

Levin, 2006 UT 50 at

,r

35 (internal quotes

omitted). As to the first interview, the trial court found that G.B. was injured while in
MacDonald's care and was transported to the hospital.

R. 1151.

MacDonald was

transported by a police officer to the police station and interviewed in an interview room
with the door closed. R. 1151. The interviewing officer read the Miranda warnings,
which include the admonition that any statements could be used against MacDonald in
court. R. 1150. The interviewing officer then conducted an "accusatory" interview, and
utilized "a line of questioning [that] implied that [MacDonald] did something wrong." R.
1151.
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Under these circumstances, a reasonable person simply would not have felt he was
at liberty to terminate the inteITogation and leave. It is no doubt possible to imagine an
abnormally assertive person, possessed of extraordinary courage, that could bring
himself, in the midst of an accusatory police interview in a closed room at the police
department, to stop answering questions, stand up, open the door, walk out of the room,
march down the hall, pass through security, out onto the street, and then walk home. But
it is unreasonable to believe that most or even many would believe that they were free to
do so.

Therefore, the trial court was coITect in concluding that MacDonald was in

custody during the first interview.
The same reasoning applies to the second interview. The trial court found that
during the second interview, two questioning officers were present.

R. 1148.

The

interview was again conducted in a closed room at the police station. R. 1149-1148.
MacDonald was the "focus of the investigation" and '1the questioning was accusatory."
R. 1148. One of the questioning officers repeatedly expressed that he did not believe
MacDonald throughout the interview. R. 1148.
As with the first interview, and for the same reasons, a reasonable person under
these circumstances would not have felt that he was at libe11y to terminate the
inte1Togation and leave.

Therefore, the trial com1 was co1Tect in concluding that

MacDonald was in custody during the second interview.
Two other points bear mentioning.

First, the questioning officers apparently

believed that Defendant was m custody, because they made an attempt, though an
inadequate one, to comply with the requirements of Miranda before both interviews. R.
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1150, 1148-1147. And "an officer's views concerning the nature of an interrogation, or
beliefs concerning the potential culpability of the individual being questioned, may be
one among many factors that bear upon the assessment whether that individual was in
custody .. .if the officer's views or beliefs were somehow manifested to the individual
under interrogation and would have affected how a reasonable person in that position
would perceive his or her freedom to leave." Levin, 20016 UT 50 at 1 3 5, 144 P .3d 1096
(quoting Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 325, 114 S.Ct. 1526, 128 L.Ed.2d 293).
Certainly, advising MacDonald that he had the right to remain silent and the right to an
attorney, prevalently associated in the popular mind with arrest, would have
communicated to MacDonald that he was not free to leave.
The second point is that Miranda warnings are "a prophylactic measure to
preserve a criminal suspect's ongoing constitutional privilege against compulsory selfincrimination," and suppression of unwarned admissions "serve[ s] to deter future

Miranda violations."

State v. Troyer, 910 P .2d 1182, 1189 (Utah 1995); State v.

Gutierrez, 864 P .2d 894, 898 (Utah App. 1993 ). Under the circumstances of this case, in
the safe surroundings of their own police station, without the need for haste, there is
simply no good reason for the questioning officers to have failed to give the Miranda
warnings. They take only a few seconds to administer. The only reason for such failure
was a concern that if the Defendant was properly informed of his rights, he would
exercise them and refuse to answer questions. This is the very thing that Miranda seeks
to prevent.
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In sum, considering the trial court's findings of fact, the trial court was correct in
ruling that MacDonald was in custody during the suppressed interviews in this case. This
Court should therefore affirm the trial court's ruling that MacDonald was in custody.
11.

MacDonald did not validly waive his rights during either suppressed interview.
The State further argues that even if MacDonald was in custody, the two

interviews should not have been suppressed because MacDonald validly waived his
rights during both interviews. The State concedes that MacDonald did not expressly
waive his rights during either interview. Br. of Appellant, 28, 32. Therefore, the State
relies on the concept of implied waiver. Br. of Appellant, 28-36.
As to the first interview, the State argues that after the questioning officer asked
MacDonald whether he understood his rights, and MacDonald answered "yes, 11 any
statements made by MacDonald constituted an implied waiver of MacDonald's rights.
Br. of Appellant, 28-29. For this argument, the State relies primarily on a quote from the
U.S. Supreme Court: "As a general proposition, the law can presume that an individual
who, with a full understanding of his or her rights, acts in a manner inconsistent with
their exercise has made a deliberate choice to relinquish the protection those rights
afford." Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370,385, 130 S.Ct. 2250, 176 L.Ed.2d 1098.
However, one of the key phrases in this quote from Berghuis is "with a full
understanding of his or her rights," and it is this portion of the quote the State fails to
fully address See id. In addition to the above general proposition, the Berghuis court
also noted that "[i]f the State establishes that a Miranda warning was given and the
accused made an uncoerced statement, this showing, standing alone, is insufficient to
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demonstrate a valid waiver of Miranda rights." Id. at 384. 'The prosecution must make
the additional showing that the accused understood these rights." Id. In Berghuis, that
showing was met because "Thompkins [the defendant] received a written copy of the

Miranda warnings; Detective Helgert detem1ined that Thompkins could read and
understand English; and Thompkins was given time to read the warnings. Thompkins,
furthermore, read aloud the fifth warning, which stated that 'you have the right to decide
at any time before or during questioning to use your right to remain silent and your right
to talk with a lawyer while you are being questioned .... [Detective] Helgert, moreover,
read the warnings aloud." Id. at 385-386.
The State has made no such showing in this case that MacDonald understood his
rights.

Unlike the defendant in Berghuis, MacDonald did not receive the Miranda

warnings in written form, and did not repeat them back to Detective Metcalf. To be sure,
Detective Metcalf read the Miranda warnings out loud to MacDonald, but undermined
the warnings by stating "this is kind of preliminary," "I'm not sure if you particularly
need these rights because we 1re just kind of asking what's going on with [G.B.]," and "I
just wanted to get that out of the way. '1 R. 1150; Br. of Appellant, 29; State's Exh. 3 at
4:30-5:02.
The State discounts the undermining problem created by Detective Metcalfs
statements, arguing that "[Detective Metcalf] never told MacDonald that he did not have
these rights or that they weren't important." Br. of Appellant, 29-30. But it is important
to remember that the State is arguing for implied waiver, and is therefore telling this
Court to look beyond what was expressly stated in the interview and consider what was
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implied by the circumstances. Although the State is correct that Detective Metcalf did
not expressly state that MacDonald did not have rights or that his rights weren't
important, he certainly implied those things.

And that is why this Court should,

reciprocally, decline to find an implied waiver under the circumstances.
The State also argues that in making the undermining statements, Detective
Metcalf sought only "to assure MacDonald that he was not in trouble at that point, a
statement that was true."

Br. of Appellant, 30.

This argument is inapposite because

Detective Metcalf had no investigatory interest in "assur[ing] MacDonald that he was not
in trouble at that point," beyond the interest in coercing MacDonald into waiving his
rights and making incriminating statements. Indeed, what was again implicit in Detective
Metcalfs statements was that there was no danger that the things MacDonald said would
be used against him, because the police weren't conducting a criminal investigation, they
were "just kind of asking what's going on with [G.B.]." As we can now see, the danger of
those statements being used against MacDonald in court to his detriment was, and is, very
real.

Therefore, contrary to the State's assertion, Detective Metcalfs statement that

MacDonald "was not in trouble" was the opposite of true.
In sum, the State has made no showing that MacDonald understood his rights, and
therefore the State's reliance on Berghuis is inappropriate. On the contrary, the record
shows that MacDonald did not understand his rights because of statements made by
Detective Metcalf which undermined the Miranda wammgs.

Therefore, this Court

should affirm the trial court, and decline to find an "implied waiver" of MacDonald's
rights in the first suppressed interview of January 18, 20 I 3.
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As to the second interview, the State concedes that Sergeant Ludlow did not read
the Miranda warnings, and that MacDonald did not expressly waive his rights. Br. of
Appellant, 32; see R. 1148-1147. Thus, as to the second interview, the State asks this
Court to find not only an implied waiver of MacDonald's rights, but also an implied
admonition of MacDonald's rights. Br. of Appellant, 32-36.
The fact that MacDonald has not been shown to have understood his rights during
the first interview effectively forecloses the State's argument that he understood them
during the second interview without being advised of them. Therefore, this Com1 should
also conclude that there was no implied waiver of MacDonald's rights during the second
interview.
However, even assummg for the sake of argument that there was an implied
waiver during the first suppressed interview, the cases cited by the State nevertheless do
not support its contention that a presumed implied waiver on January 18, 2013 would still
have been effective in a second interview on January 23, 2013.
For example, the State cites State v. Teuscher, 883 P .2d 922 (Utah App. 1994),
overruled on other grounds by State v. Levin, 2006 UT 50, 144 P .3d 1096, for the

proposition that "a [Miranda] warning once given may have continuing effect beyond the
interview in question." 883 P.2d at 930 n. 5; see Br. of Appellant, 32-33. But the facts of
Teuscher are not similar to those in this case. The Teuscher court noted that, in its case,

"defendant was given Miranda warnings on January 3 and she was aware that the
purpose of the January 6 interview was merely to record the statements she made on
January 3. Defendant provided no new information on January 6, and she was not in
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custody during the interview .... [e ]vcn if we were to require a new Miranda warning for
the January 6 interview, the failure to so warn in this case would be harmless error
because defendant divulged no new information on January 6." Id.
In this case, the purpose of the second interview on January 23, 20 I 3 was not do
record statements made during the first interview on January 18, 2013. Indeed, the trial
court found

that during this second interview,

"defendant provided additional

information." R. 1148. Furthermore, as noted above, unlike the defendant in Teuscher,
MacDonald was in custody for the January 23, 20 I~ interview for Miranda purposes.
Therefore, Teuscher does not support the State's argument.
The State further cites a number of cases from other jurisdictions in which
previously given Miranda warnings were held to be valid for subsequently conducted
interviews. However, in each of these cases, the facts differ markedly from the facts of
this case because in each of them, there was an express waiver of Miranda rights during
the first interview.
In the first case cited by the State, Biddy v. Diamond, 516 F.2d 118 (5th Cir.
1975), the Fifth Circuit held that a Miranda warning administered on December 15 was
effective twelve days later on December 27.

Id. at 122.

In that case, however, the

defendant was verbally advised of her Miranda rights during the first interview and
waived them in writing. Id. at 120. Later that day, she was again advised of her rights,
signed a second waiver form, and requested a lawyer. Id. at 120. It was only under these
circumstances that the Biddy court held that another Miranda warning twelve days later
would have been "needlessly repetitious." Id. at 122.
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In the second case cited by the State, Koger v. State, 17 P.3d 428 (Nev. 2001), the
Nevada Supreme Court also ruled that a Miranda warning given on April 22 was still
effective during a subsequent interview twelve days later on May 4. Id. at 433. But in

Koger, as in Biddy, the defendant had been verbally advised of her rights twice on the day
of the first interview, and had read and signed a Miranda waiver form.

Id. at 430.

Furthermore, the defendant had expressed confusion about her rights on the day of the
first interview, and the interviewing officer had cleared up the confusion and clarified
that the defendant understood her rights. Id. Finally, on the day of the second interview,
the defendant expressly told the interviewing sergeant that she had been advised of her
rights previously. Id. The Nevada Supreme Court was careful to note that "twelve days
may be too long under different circumstances," but given the facts of the case, the court
held that the first Miranda warnings were still valid. Id. at 433.
The remainder of the cases cited by the State also present facts that demonstrate an
express waiver of Miranda rights during the first interview, as well as other important
facts that distinguish them from this case. Br. of Appellant, 34; see Davis v. State, 698
So.2d 1182, 1186, 1189 (Fla. 1997) (second interview was initiated because defendant
wrote a note asking to speak with police officers about the case); Martin v. Wainwright,
770 F.2d 918, 929-931 (11th Cir. 1985), modified in unrelated part by 781 F .2d 185 (11th
Cir. 1986) (defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his rights during the first
interview, and had subsequently been instructed by his attorney not to speak with
anyone); Maguire v. United States, 396 F.2d 327 (9th Cir. 1968) (defendant given

Miranda warnings before both first and second interview, though the defendant
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contradicted the questioning officers' testimony); United States v. Clay, 408 F.3d 214,
222 n. 11 (5th Cir. 2005) (the defendant did not contest the validity of the original

Miranda warning, given at the time of arrest two days prior to interview); People v.
Mickle, 814 P.2d 290 (Cal. 1991) (defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his rights
twice the first day and was still in custody 36 hours later for third interview); Osborne v.

State, 430 S.E.2d 576, 578 (Ga. 1993) (defendant was Mirandized three times and signed
a written waiver on the day prior to the interview).
None of the cases cited by the State address the concern in this case. The facts of
these cases show an express Miranda waiver before the first interview, and often the
defendants these cases had been advised of and expressly waived their rights multiple
times and in writing. That is not the case here. In this case, MacDonald was advised of
his rights only once, before the first interview, and there is at best, for the sake of
argument, only an implied waiver of those rights before the first interview.
The second interview occurred five days after the first, and although MacDonald
nodded affirmatively when Sergeant Ludlow asked MacDonald if he remembered "about
[his] rights and all that stuff, 11 there was no express waiver of those rights before Sergeant
Ludlow began questioning him. See R. 1148-1147. Thus, even if we assume, arguendo,
that MacDonald implied an understanding of his rights during the first interview five
days before, there is nothing in the record to indicate that this implied understanding was
still there five days later. Therefore, this Court should affirm the trial court, and also
decline to find an "implied waiver" of MacDonald1s rights in the second suppressed
interview of January 23, 2013.
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111.

Conclusion.
In sum, the State's arguments that MacDonald was not in custody, and that he

impliedly waived his rights before the two suppressed interview, are invalid. Therefore,
this Court should affirm the trial court's mling suppressing the two interviews of January
18, 2013 and January 23, 2013.
d.

This court should also affirm the suppression of MacDonald's written
confession at the end of the second suppressed interview.
Although, as the State points out, it is not clear from the trial court's written mling

whether it intended to suppress the written statement MacDonald produced at the
conclusion of the second suppressed interview, the trial court verbally stated on the
record that it intended to suppress the written statement.

R. 1202:64.

The State

challenges the suppression of this written statement, which was given on a form
containing a Miranda warning.
On this point, the State briefly discusses Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 124
S.Ct. 260 I, 159 L.Ed.2d 643 (2004), cited by the trial court in its ruling.

Br. of

Appellant, 36-38. The State correctly notes that Seibert produced no majority opinion.
Br. of Appellant, 37.

However, the State fails to acknowledge that while Seibert

produced no majority opinion, it did produce a majority judgment rejecting the kind of
intentional two-step interrogation approach at issue in this case in which police elicit a
confession without Miranda warnings, and then administer Miranda warnings before
continuing the interrogation and reaffirming the same confession. Compare 542 U.S. at
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607-617 (opinion of SOUTER, J., joined by STEVENS, GINSBURG, and BREYER, JJ.)

with 542 U.S. 618-622 (opinion of KENNEDY, J.).
The State contends that the U.S. Supreme Court later adopted Justice Kennedy's

Seibert concurrence in Bobby v. Dixon,_ U.S._, 132 S.Ct. 26 (2011).

However,

while the Bobby court indeed cited Justice Kennedy's concurrence, it also cited the

Seibert plurality opinion, and did not prefer one over the other. See 132 S.Ct. at 31-32.
Therefore, the State errs in arguing that the Court adopted Justice Kennedy's Seibert
concurrence in Bobby.
This error aside, the implication that Justice Kennedy's Seibert concurrence would
lead to a more favorable result for the State than the view of the Seibert plurality is
misplaced.

In his Seibert concurrence, Justice Kennedy "agree[ d] with much in the

careful and convincing opinion for the plurality," differing only with the plurality in his
belief that in a two-step interrogation approach, postwarning statements could be
admissible if "curative measures" were taken, such as "a substantial break in time and
circumstances between the prewaming statement and the Miranda warning," or "an
additional warning that explains the likely inadmissibility of the prewarning custodial
statement." 542 U.S. 6 I 8-622.
No such curative measures were taken in this case.

The trial court found no

substantial break in time and circumstances between the unwarned verbal statements and
warned written statements MacDonald gave during the second suppressed interview.
Although there was an hour between the time detectives ended the verbal interview and
their return with the statement form, there is no indication that this delay was "designed
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to ensure that a reasonable person in the suspect's situation would understand the import
and effect of the Miranda warning and of the Miranda waiver," or that the delay
~'allow[ ed] the accused to distinguish between the two contexts and appreciate that the
interrogation ha[d] taken a new tum." 542 U.S. at 622.
Certainly, there was no substantial break in circumstances that accompanied the
break in time.

Neither did the trial court find that the questioning officers gave any

additional warning explaining the likely inadmissibility of the prewarning custodial
statement. Therefore, Justice Kennedy's Seibert concurrence is of no avail to the State,
and this Court should affirm the trial court's suppression of the MacDonald's written
statement given at the conclusion of the second suppressed interview.

II.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN EXCLUDING THE 404(B)
EVIDENCE.
Utah R. Evid. 404 provides that "[ e]vidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is not

admissible to prove a person's character in order to show that on a particular occasion the
person acted in conformity with the character." Utah R. Evid. 404(b)(l); see Addendum
A. Although "[such] evidence may be admissible for another purpose," "courts must
make a threshold detennination of the genuine underlying purpose for admission of the
evidence." State v. Lucero, 2014 UT 15,

~

14, 328 P .3d 841 (internal quotes omitted);

see Utah R. Evid. 404(b )(2).
Indeed, "in the proper exercise of [their] discretion, trial judges must scrupulously
examine [404(b)] evidence before it is admitted." State v. Widdison, 2001 UT 60,

,r 42,

28 P.3d 1278 (internal quotes omitted). This "scrupulous examination" has traditionally
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entailed a three part test: 1) whether the evidence is actually being offered for a proper,
non-character purpose, such as those specifically listed in the rule; 2) whether the
evidence meets the requirements of Utah R. Evid. 402, which excludes all evidence that
is not relevant; and 3) whether the evidence meets the requirements of Utah R. Evid. 403,
which provides that evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. State v. Decorso, 1999 UT 57, 1121-23,
993 P.2d 83 7. Recently, the Utah Supreme Court has added a fourth part to this test, a
requirement that "matters of conditional relevance must also meet the preponderance of
the evidence standard under Utah Rule of Evidence 104(b ). " Lucero, 2014 UT 15 at

il

13.
In this case, the trial court admitted vanous items of 404(b) evidence, and
excluded various other items. Although the State apparently concedes that the trial court
"scrupulously examined" this evidence, the State challenges the trial court's decision to
exclude some of the evidence. Br. of Appellant, 38-50; see also Lucero, 2014 UT 15 at il
37 ("We now clarify that the scrupulous examination requirement is met when the trial
court engages in this three- or four-step analysis on the record").
The resolution of the State's 404(b) challenge is easier than the resolution of its

Miranda challenge, because unlike Miranda rulings, which are reviewed for correctness,
a trial court's ruling on 404(b) evidence is reviewed only for an abuse of discretion. State

v. Verde, 2012 UT 60,113,296 P.3d 673. Under this standard of review, a trial court's
ruling on 404(b) evidence is "entitled to some deference. Id. at

if 19. We now address

each of the pieces of evidence excluded by the trial court under Rule 404(b) in tum.
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a.

The trial court did not err in excluding evidence that MacDonald yelled at the
children.
The trial court excluded evidence that MacDonald yelled excessively at G.B. and

K.M. because the trial court concluded that the evidence was not offered for a noncharacter purpose.

R. 1169

Specifically, the trial court ruled that the evidence was

"offered to show that [MacDonald] was an impatient father and therefore more likely to
have acted in accordance with that bad character trait." Id.
The State counters that this evidence was offered for the non-character purpose of
showing a ''motive" for harming G.B.

Br. of Appellant, 45.

The State argues that

evidence of yelling shows that MacDonald had the motive of "contempt" for G.B. Id.
This motive, the State argues, makes it less likely "that this baby was injured
accidentally." Id.
The State fails to explain, however, how "contempt" can properly be characterized
as a "motive." If a father's child is severely injured by a neighbor's unchained dog, the
father may feel contempt for the neighbor and wish to harm him.

If a dutiful wife

discovers that her husband is an unfaithful philanderer, she may feel contempt for her
husband and wish to harm him. But the contempt is not the motive for the harm. The
motive for harm in both of these instances is not "contempt," but rather a desire for
revenge. The State therefore errs in arguing that evidence of "contempt" is evidence of a
"motive" in this case.
It is also significant to note that the State's evidence was that MacDonald yelled
not only at G.B., but at K.M. as well.

This indicates that the purpose served by the
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yelling evidence was offered not to show 11 motive" to harm G.B. specifically, but rather,
as the trial court put it, "offered to show that [MacDonald] was an impatient father."
Although "contempt" cannot be properly characterized as a "motive," the yelling
evidence might have marginally contributed to a non-character purpose of showing
"contempt" for G.B. in general.

But while some evidence of prior acts may have a

bearing on a non-character purpose, "it may also yield an equally strong, and improper,
propensity inference."

Lucero, 2014 UT 15 at

il

14.

Trial courts are within their

discretion to reject evidence that yields such "dual inferences" when the improper
inference outweighs the proper one, as the trial court did in this case. Id. Therefore, this
Court should affinn the trial court's decision to exclude the yelling evidence.
The State further argues that it has a right to introduce the yelling evidence
because the evidence provides "context" for MacDonald's relationship with G.B. Br. of
Appellant, 45-4 7. Without this evidence, the State argues, the jury will be prevented
from "seeing the true picture" of MacDonald's relationship with G.B. Id. at 47.
What the State fails to acknowledge is that the evidence it was seeking to admit in
the trial court was not just evidence that MacDonald yelled at G.B., but that MacDonald
yelled constantly and excessively in general. R. 1173. The yelling evidence is thus not
evidence of a particular relationship with G.B., but of a bad character trait. Thus, the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in excluding this evidence for lack of non-character
purpose.
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b.

The trial court did not err in excluding evidence that MacDonald called G.B.
a whiner.

The State does not separately address the trial court's exclusion of the evidence
that MacDonald called G .B. a whiner, but appears to lump it in with the yelling evidence.
Br. of Appellant, 44-47. The trial court acknowledged that the yelling evidence had some
probative value in showing that MacDonald had "contempt" for G.B., but felt that the
probative value of this purpose was "paper-thin" and was "substantially outweighed by
the improper character purpose-that [MacDonald] is an impatient or bad father."
Therefore, the same arguments apply to this evidence as to the yelling evidence, and the
trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding it.
c.

The trial court did not err in excluding evidence that MacDonald "flipped
ofr' G.B.

The State again does not separately address the trial court's exclusion of evidence
that MacDonald "flipped off' G.B., and the trial court's ruling on the non-character
purpose of this issue was substantially the same as its ruling on the yelling and whiner
evidence described above.

See R. 1167-1166.

But the trial court's ruling on this

evidence bears some brief additional analysis because, with regard to this evidence, the
trial court's ruling implicates the fourth prong of the "scrupulous examination" test.
In State v. Lucero, the Utah Supreme Court added the fourth requirement to the
"scrupulous examination" test, namely, that matters of conditional relevance under Utah
R. Evid. 104 be proved by a preponderance of the evidence. 328 P.3d at

,r,r

18-29. In

other words, a trial judge should only allow a jury to hear evidence of a prior bad act
under Rule 404(b) if the judge determines that there is sufficient evidence that a jury
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could find, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the prior bad act was committed and
that the defendant committed it. See id.
In this case, that requirement placed upon the trial judge the responsibility of
determining whether there was sufficient evidence that MacDonald '~flipped off' Gabriel
such that a jury could determine, by a preponderance of the evidence, that MacDonald
did, in fact, "flip off' Gabriel.

Apparently the trial judge did not believe that the

evidence was strong enough. The trial court's mling indicated that "the strength of the
evidence is lacking" and noted specifically that "Loveridge testified that she saw
Defendant do this through a reflection in a fish tank." R. 1167 Thus, the trial judge
apparently did not believe that there was sufficient evidence that the "flipping off'
incident actually occurred such that a jury could conclude that it did occur by a
preponderance of the evidence. That the trial court had this standard in mind is further
evidenced by its express invocation of Utah R. Evid. 104 when addressing the same issue
relating to the prior instances of abuse evidence. See R. 1164.
In the end, as with the yelling and whiner evidence, the trial court mled that "[t]he
improper character purpose-to show that [MacDonald] is an impatient father or cmde
person-predominates." R. 1166 The same arguments apply with equal force to this
conclusion as they do to the yelling and whiner evidence. The trial court did not abuse its
discretion in excluding this evidence for lack of a proper non-character purpose.
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d.

The trial court did not err in excluding evidence that MacDonald was iealous
of G.B.

The trial court concluded that MacDonald's alleged jealousy of G.B., testified to
by Addie Loveridge, was not a "bad act" within the meaning of Utah R. Evid. 404(b ). R.
1166-1165. Therefore, the trial court analyzed this evidence under Utah R. Evid. 70 I.
Id. Ultimately, the trial court excluded the evidence under Rule 701 as a lay opinion of

Addie Loveridge that was "not helpful to determining a fact in issue." Id.
The State has not at all addressed the trial court's determination that the jealousy
evidence was not a "bad act," nor has it in any way analyzed the evidence under Utah R.
Evid. 701. The State's challenge to the jealousy evidence is, therefore, inadequately
briefed, and this Court should decline to address it. See State v. Davie, 2011 UT App
380, ,I 16, 264 P.3d 770 ("The Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure require an appellant's
brief to contain the contentions and reasons of the appellant with respect to the issues
presented, with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on.")
e.

The trial court did not err in excluding evidence that MacDonald previously
injured G.B.

Finally, the State challenges the trial court's exclusion of evidence "that
[MacDonald] (1) may have bruised Gabriel's cheeks when attempting to administer
medicine to him; and (2) several times picked Gabriel up by the arms in a rough manner,
carried him across the room, and dropped him on a bean bag chair." R. 1165. As with
the other 404(b) evidence, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding this
evidence.
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The basis for the trial court's decision with regard to the prior abuse evidence was,
as before, lack of a proper non-character purpose. R. 1165-1164. As to the evidence that
MacDonald picked up G.B. and dropped him on a bean bag chair, the trial court noted
that "[a]t first glance, the evidence appears to fit into the 'absence of mistake or accident'
box;' as has been urged by the State on appeal. R. 1165; see Br. of Appellant, 45. But
the court noted that this proffered non-character purpose was not logically congment with
the State's theory of the case. The trial court noted that although MacDonald admitted to
accidentally dropping G.B. on January 18, 2013, the State's position was that the fall
described by MacDonald could not have produced G.B.'s injuries. R. 1164. Therefore,
although evidence that MacDonald previously dropped G.B. might support a theory that
MacDonald, contrary to his assertion, dropped G.B. intentionally on the day of his
injuries, rather than by mistake or accident, this did not fit the State's theory of the case
and therefore the evidence was iITelevant. Id.
The trial court's approach in evaluating this evidence is consistent with 404(b) law.
The Utah Supreme Court instructed in Verde:
[W]hen prior misconduct evidence is presented under rule 404(b ), the court should
carefully consider whether it is genuinely being offered for a proper, non-character
purpose, or whether it might actually be aimed at sustaining an improper inference
of action in conformity with a person's bad character. And even if the evidence
may sustain both proper and improper inferences under rule 404(b ), the court
should balance the two against each other under rule 403, excluding the bad acts
evidence if its tendency to sustain a proper inference is outweighed by its
propensity for an improper inference or for jury confusion about its real purpose.
Such weighing is essential to preserve the integrity of mle 404(b ). Without it,
evidence of past misconduct could routinely be allowed to sustain an inference of
action in conformity with bad character--so long as the proponent of the evidence
could proffer a plausible companion inference that does not contravene the rule.
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2012 UT 60 at~ 18.
The trial court followed this instruction in this case.

The trial court fully

considered the proposed non-character purpose of absence of mistake or accident, but
correctly felt that any tendency to sustain that inference was outweighed by its propensity
for an improper inference or for jury confusion about the evidence's real purpose. R.
1165-1164.

Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the

evidence.
At the trial court, as it has on appeal, the State also asserted that it was offering all
of its 404(6) evidence to prove "motive," although it did not explain how evidence of
prior abuse would prove motive other than to say that MacDonald's "history of
interactions and involvements with the victim is important to let the jury gain insight into
their relationship."

See R. 958-957; see also Decorso, 1999 UT 57 at

~

21 ("the

proponent [of 404(6) evidence] must demonstrate that the evidence is actually being
offered for a proper, non-character purpose, such as those specifically listed in the rule").
The trial court evidently, and correctly, rejected the State's unexplained and
unsupported proposed non-character purpose of motive.
should also reject it on appeal.

R. 1165-1164.

This Court

The State has failed to show how evidence that

MacDonald dropped G.B. into a beanbag chair demonstrates any "motive" to severely
injure G. B. To any extent that it does support such an inference, this inference, as the
trial court concluded, is substantially outweighed by the improper inference that
MacDonald had a bad character.

Therefore, this Court should affirm the trial court's

exclusion of this evidence.
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The same is true of the evidence that MacDonald bruised G.B.'s cheeks while
administering medicine to him. The trial court likewise found no predominating noncharacter purpose for this evidence. The trial court noted the lack of "similarity between
the mechanism of injury to [G.B.]'s cheeks and the mechanism of injury that caused
[G.B. 's] brain damage." R. 1164. The trial court also noted the circumstantial nature of
this evidence, and the predominating inference from this evidence that MacDonald had a
bad character. R. 1164.
The trial court was correct in considering these issues. The trial court conducted a
proper "scrupulous examination," and the State does not contend otherwise. The trial
court correctly concluded that evidence of prior abuse was only marginally probative of
the State's proposed non-character purposes, and that there was a high danger of improper
prejudice resulting from this evidence.

Therefore, this Court should affirm the trial

court's exclusion of all of the prior abuse evidence.
It is worth noting that the trial com1 admitted some of the State's 404(b) evidence
that actually demonstrated a possible motive for MacDonald to injure G.B. Namely, the
trial court admitted evidence that MacDonald disliked G.B. because of his race, that
MacDonald used racial slurs against G.B., and that MacDonald considered G.B. to be
"the other" in the family.

R. I 168.

As noted by the trial court, this evidence was

probative of an actual motive: a desire to remove a member of the family that MacDonald
felt did not belong. R. 1168-1167.
The admission of this evidence demonstrates that the trial court engaged in a
careful consideration of the State's proposed non-character purpose of motive, and simply
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excluded the evidence that did not logically fit the State's theory of the case, but rather
tended to support an inference that MacDonald was a bad person.
In sum, the trial court properly excluded the 404(b) evidence for lack of a
predominating non-character purpose.

Therefore, this Court should affirm the trial

court's ruling excluding the evidence.

f.

The probative value of the excluded evidence was substantially outweighed by
the danger of unfair preiudice.
The State argues that the excluded evidence had significant probative value that

was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, pursuant to the
requirement that a trial court examine the admissibility of 404(b) evidence under Utah R.
Evid. 403. This argument shoots wide of the trial court's ruling, because the trial court
excluded the 404(b) evidence on the ground of a lack of proper non-character purpose,
and not on 403 grounds. However, we will analyze this issue in response to the State's
arguments.
As before, the State insists that the excluded 404(b) evidence has "strong probative
value" because it demonstrates "a plausible reason why this adult man would violently
assault a helpless baby that he now claims to love." Br. of Appellant, 48-49. But the
State again does not explain how yelling at everyone in general, "flipping off' G .B., or
even injuring G.B. on prior occasions demonstrates a reason to severely injure G.B. At
most, that evidence demonstrates, as noted by the trial court, that MacDonald was "an
impatient father or crude person." R. 1166. Evidence that could show an actual reason,
such as that MacDonald disliked G.B. because of his race and because MacDonald
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viewed G.B. as 11 a stranger or interloper in the family [MacDonald] wanted to have with
Loveridge, 11 has been admitted by the trial court.

R. 1168.

Therefore, the State's

argument that the excluded evidence shows a reason for MacDonald's alleged actions and
therefore has "strong probative value" is without merit.
The State also argues that the excluded evidence is admissible under Rule 403
because it is "tame in comparison" to other evidence that will be admitted at trial. Br. of
Appellant, 50 (citing Lucero, 2014 UT 15 at il35).

It is true that there are cases that

support this argument for admissibility under Rule 403. But frankly, this argument does
not make sense and has never made sense.
The argument that a jury will not be improperly impacted by evidence that a
defendant did something bad, simply because that defendant is accused of doing
something much worse, is illogical. It relies on an insidious premise: that a jury believes
from the outset of trial that the defendant committed the charged crimes. If you accept
this dangerous premise, it is no doubt possible to reach the conclusion that a jury would
be unmoved by evidence of crimes lesser than those that are the subject of the trial.
But the premise is, fortunately, invalid.

The reality of trials in this state and

country is that juries are asked to presume that their defendants are innocent.

It is

therefore incompatible to say that if, for example, a jury hears that a defendant who is
accused of committing a violent murder is also a drug user, the jury will not be unfairly
prejudiced against the defendant. The jury presumes that the defendant is innocent of the
murder, and is therefore completely unaffected by evidence of the violence of the murder

unless it believes that the defendant committed the murder. And it is in making the
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decision about whether the defendant, and not someone else, committed the murder that
evidence of unrelated drug use is so damaging. It tends to lead the jury to believe that the
defendant is a bad person, and therefore more capable of committing the kind of violence
the jury has been exposed to during the trial. This is the "danger of unfair prejudice"
condemned by Rule 403.
Applying these principles to this case, the hazard of the State's argument
exposed.

The jury in this case will be commanded to presume that MacDonald

innocent of the cnme of injuring G.B.

IS

IS

Although the jury's tolerance for disturbing

evidence will no doubt be raised by the admission of evidence of G.8.'s injuries, the
primary question for the jury will not be to decide whether G.B. was injured. The critical
question the jury will be asked to decide is whether MacDonald was the one who injured
G.B., and on that score, there is a substantial danger that evidence "that [MacDonald] is
an impatient father or crude person" will lead the jury to convict on an improper basis.
Therefore, the excluded evidence is not admissible under Rule 403, despite the fact that
the jury will see some disturbing evidence of G .B. 's injuries during the trial.
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CONCLUSION
The trial com1 correctly determined that MacDonald was in custody during the
two suppressed interviews, and that MacDonald did not impliedly waive his Miranda
rights. The trial court scrupulously examined the 404(b) evidence, and properly excluded
it for lack of a true non-character purpose.

Furthermore, the 404(b) evidence is also

inadmissible under Utah R. Evid. 403 because any marginal probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.

Therefore, MacDonald

respectfully asks this Court to affim1 the trial court.
DATED this 3 rd day of March, 2016.
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ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A

Utah R. Evid. 404

@

Utah Rules of Evidence - Rule 404. Character Evidence; Crimes or Other Acts
(a)

Character Evidence.
(1)

Prohibited Uses. Evidence of a person's character or character trait is not
admissible to prove that on a particular occasion the person acted in
conformity with the character or trait.

(2)

Exceptions for a Defendant or Victim in a Criminal Case. The following
exceptions apply in a criminal case:
(A)

a defendant may offer evidence of the defendant's pertinent trait, and
if the evidence is admitted, the prosecutor may offer evidence to
rebut it;

(B)

subject to the limitations in Rule 412, a defendant may offer
evidence of an alleged victim's pertinent trait, and if the evidence is
admitted, the prosecutor may:

(C)

(3)

(b)

(i)

offer evidence to rebut it; and

(ii)

offer evidence of the defendant's same trait; and

in a homicide case, the prosecutor may offer evidence of the alleged
victim's trait of peacefulness to rebut evidence that the victim was
the first aggressor.

Exceptions for a Witness. Evidence of a witness's character may be
admitted under Rules 607, 608, and 609.

Crimes, Wrongs, or Other Acts.
(1)

Prohibited Uses. Evidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is not admissible
to prove a person's character in order to show that on a particular occasion
the person acted in conformity with the character.

(2)

Permitted Uses; Notice in a Criminal Case. This evidence may be
admissible for another purpose, such as proving motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of
accident. On request by a defendant in a criminal case, the prosecutor must:
(A)

provide reasonable notice of the general nature of any such evidence
that the prosecutor intends to offer at trial; and

(B)

(c)

do so before trial, or during trial if the court excuses lack of pretrial
notice on good cause shown.

Evidence of Similar Crimes in Child-Molestation Cases.
(I)

Permitted Uses. In a criminal case in which a defendant is accused of child
molestation, the court may admit evidence that the defendant committed
any other acts of child molestation to prove a propensity to commit the
crime charged.

(2)

Disclosure. If the prosecution intends to offer this evidence it shall provide
reasonable notice in advance of trial, or during trial if the court excuses
pretrial notice on good cause shown.

(3)

For purposes of this rule "child molestation" means an act committed in
relation to a child under the age of 14 which would, if committed in this
state, be a sexual offense or an attempt to commit a sexual offense.

(4)

Rule 404( c) does not limit the admissibility of evidence otherwise
admissible under Rule 404(a), 404(b), or any other rule of evidence.

ADDENDUM B

Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order Granting
Defendant's Motion to Suppress in Part and Denying the Motion in
Part

The Order of Court is staled below:
Dated: Fcbnmry 05. 2015
Isl DEREK P PULLAN
04:38:58 P'.'vl
District Court Judg\!

LISA CRAWFORD (10062)

UTAH COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER ASSOCIATION
Attorneys for Defendant
51 South University A venue, Suite 206
Provo, Utah 8460 I
Telephone 852-1070

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

Plaintiff

FINDNG OF FACTS, CONCLUSION OF
LAW AND ORDER GRANTING
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS
IN PART AND DENYING Tl-IE tv!OTION
IN PART

vs.

CASE NO. 131400351

STATE OF UTAH,

ROBBIE MACDONALD
JUDGE: Derck P. Pullan
Defendant.

Pursuant to Dcfcndam·s briefs. the State's verbal response. the cvidentiary he.iring amt oral
arguments. lhc Court hereby makes the following linding of facts, conclusion

February 05. 2015 04:38 PM

or law and order:

i o! ~G

I.

FINDING OF FACTS
Defendant's Interview on January I 8, 2013
I.

I. On January 18.2013. in American Fork, Utah. a 911 call was made regarding G.B .. a
I 0-month old: who was not breathing. At the time of the call, defendant was
watching G.B., his girlfriend~s son.
2. After paramedics transported G.B. to the hospital~ Detective Christensen interviewed
defendant a1 his home . .1\ftcr the initial intt:rvicw at the scene. Detective ivietcaif
transported defendant to the American Fork police station for further questioning.
3. Detective Metcalf interviewed defendant regarding the events that led up to the child

sustaining injuries.
4. The interview room door was closed but not locked.
5. Detective Metcalf was the only other person in the interview room. other than the
de lcndanl.

6. The interview was audio and video recorded.
7. During lhc interview, defendant stated that G.B. had fallen asleep on the living room
lloor. I le picked up Ci.B. and laid him down in his crib. When dclendant later

checked on Ci.IL he found him unresponsive with vomit on his mouth and not
breathing. Defendant yelled for his roommate lo help. The roommate called 91 I and
began CPR. Paramedics and police arrived on scene and took over resuscitation
efforts. G.B. was transported to American Fork Hospital.
,.
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8. After the interview. defendant \\'as not arrested and a police officer trnnsponcd him
back to his residence.
9. The Court finds that defendant ,,. as interrogated.
1

1O.The proximity or the interrogation is close in time to the child having suffered
serious physical injury.
l l .The interview was accusatory in nature.
12.Detectivc Metcalf s line

or questioning implied that defendant did something wrong.

l 3.Defondant was left alone in the interrogation room for approximately forty minutes
during the course of the interview.
14.The Court finds that def-enclant was not free to leave.
15.The Court finds that defendant \:vas in custody for purposes of Miranda.

16.A !though Detective Metcalf read defendant his Miranda rights, he failed to obtain an
express waiver of 1'vfim11da rights. since he never asks defendant if he waived his
rights.
17./\dditionally. the Court finds that Dctectiv~ Metcalf undermined the Jfiranda
warning when he slated he wasn't sure that defendant needed his rights to be read to
@

him.
18.Thc Court finds that defendant did not have a full awareness of the nature and

1,.;onscqucnc-es of the rights being abandoned and that an implied waiwr was not the
product of a

(j)
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Ll~GAL CONCLUSION:
Defendant's Interview on January 18, 2013

1.

The Court concludes thai di:fendant was subjected to a custodial interrogation and Detective
Me teal f v-.-as rcqu ired to provide defendant with the Mirando warning.

2.

The Court concludes there was no express waiver of Miranda rights.

3. Expressions

or police that undermine the importance or the constitutional rights described

in

the Miranda warning significantly impacts the Court's determination of whether or not
waiver is voluntary. knowing and intelligent.
4. The Court concludes there was no implied waiver.

5. For these reasons~ the Court grants the defendant's motion to suppress statements made by
c.klendant to Detective Metcalf on January 18, 2013.

JI.
FINDING OF FACTS:
Defendant's Interview on January 23, 2013

I. Du~ilJrs frum the Primary Chi ldrcn' s I lospital diagnosed G. B. with Abusive I lead Trauma.
Subsequently. defendant was requested by polict: to return lo the police station lor further
questioning.

2. [k lcnd:.mt · s grand fothcr drove him to the American Fork poi ice <lcpartmcnt on .ianuaryrl ~ --! ·-t 11 •:~..,j
Vv.l.J.. i u
,~cl)ruary 05, 2015 04:38 Prvi
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2013.
3. Sergeant Ludlow interviewed defendant! while Lieutenant Liddiard \:vas also present in the
room.

4. The interview room was closed but not locked.
5. The intcrvie,1'1 was audio and video recorded.

6. During this interview~ defendant provided additional information. He stated that while he
@

carried a sleeping G.B. to his crib that he tripped on a rug. and that G.B. !ell from his arms,
and that his head hit the cement llooring. He then comforted the child and laid him down in
his crib.

7. After the intervicv,\ defendant was permitted tu leave the police station with his grandfather
and was not arrested al that lime.

8. The Court finds that the interview· was an interrogation. The intci·view took place at the
police station, defendant was the focus

or the investigation and the questioning ,vas

accusatory.
@

9. Scrg~ant Ludlow stated that everything was pointing at defendant and that there \Vas more llJ

the dclcndanr s version of events. The Sergeant stJtecl that de lendant was being -~deceit ru 1--

®

and continued tn express his non-belief during the interrogation.

I O.Thc Court finds that defendant Jid not feel free to lcav1:.
11.The Court finds that defendant was in custody ror purpos~:.; of .\,firando.
I 2. Prior to c!dcndant · ~ statements. Sergeant Ludlov, asked dcl"t:ndant i r he n:mcmben;d when

@
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Detective Mete al f ~-brought you in [ancl'J talked to you about your rights and all that stu rf?
Do you remember all that stufC rightT Defendant nods in the affirmative and Sergeant
Ludlow proceeded to question him.

13.Scrgeant Ludlow did not ask defendant if he was willing to speak to police, rather he
continued with the interrogation.
14.After defendant made statements to Sergeant Ludlo\,v. he was then asked to provide a signed
written statement that included the 1\.tfiranda warning.
15.The Court finds no express Mimnda warning was given by Sergeant Ludlow.
16.The interrogation occurred five days after the first interrogation. This fact is important to the
Court. especially since ddendanl was not read his .·\t/ira11da rights or asked if he was \Villing
to waive his rights.
17 .Sergeant Ludlow· s reference to de fcndant's "rights and al I that stun:" did not explain to

defendant the :\4imnda warning in a way that would explain how to exercise his rights.
18.The Court docs not find fot:is Lhat c.kmonstratc an implied ,,·aiver.
19.Thc Court finds the polici.: aski.:cl questions first and lhcn provided :\1iranda later.

LEGAL CONCLUSION:
Dcfcndanfs Interview on .January 23, 2013

I. The Court concltHks that c.kl;:ndant was subjected to a custodial interrogation and Sergeant
Ludknv was rcqu ired to pnwidc d1:fen,fant ,1-·irh rlw Miranda warning.
;"\
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I. That kind

or reference to rights read five days earlier did not place defendant in a situation

where he could make a waiver with foll awareness, both as to the nature and consequence of
the rights that he was abandoning.

2. The fact that defendant signs a written statement with a Miranda warning after making

statements during the course of the interrogation does not correct the previous mistake,
pursuant to the ruling in Missouri v. SedJert, 542 U.S. 600 (2004).
3. The State failed to meet its burden to demonstrate that there was either an express or implied

@

\\.aivcr of .'vlimnda rights.

:i_

Under the totality of the circumstances, the Couri finds that this interrogation resulted in an
unwarned statement and grants defendant's motion to suppress the statements made to
Sergeant Ludlow on January 23, 2013.
UL

FINDING OF FACTS:
Defendant's Interview on Jan mu-~· 24, 2013
@

I. J\t the request

or police. defendant returned lo the American Fork police department for

additional questioning. Defendant's grandfather drove him to the police department on
January 2-L 20 I 3

2. D1.:kndant \\ as inll..:rvit:,\ l.'d by LiL"Llh.:na11l Liddiard.
3. The inkrvicv. door was closed but not locked.
4. The intcrvic,, was audiLl anJ vicJco rc<.:orded.

I- ebruary 05. 2015 04:38 PM

7 of 10

5. J\t the beginning to the interview, Lieutenant Liddiard informed defendant that his

grandfather had already gone home. Lieutenant Liddiard told the grandfather that he didn "t
know ho,, long the intcn icw would be. Lieutenant Liddiard told the grandfather that he
would take cleli~ndant home. Defendant \Vas then asked. ··1._ that okay irwcjust take you

home?"' De Cendant rep! icd. ··That· s fine.··

6. During the interview, defendant repc;1tcd the ·'trippin{· and .;dropping·' statement.

7. After this interview. police took defendant back to the residence to videotape him conducting
a demonstration

or the inc id~nt.

8. Prior to dci'<:ndant · s statements. Licutcnant Liddiard rel't:renct.:J the Miranda warning given
earlier by Detective Metcalf on January 18. 2013. and that Sergeant Ludlow had reminded
defendant

or his :\-firandu rights again on January 23.2013 with Sergeant Ludlow.

Lieutenant Liddiard then suggested to Jcknda11t that. .. You·rc stiii wiiling to talk lo us
today.,. to which dcfi:ndant a ffirrns.

9. Then Lieutenant Liddiard gives a complete Miranda warning and asks cklcndant if he
understands the right~. Ue kndant sa'.':s_ --y cs.·· I. iddiard asks. ·· ;\re you st ii I willing to talk to
us·?·· Dclc11da11t artirms.

I O.Lieut~n..:nt Liddiard c:-.:prL·sscd his 11u11-bclid. in dcfi::ndant ·:-.story and the questioning was
'1Ccusatory. I ,icuknant Liddiard rnntinued to kll dckndant that his story was ••impossible ..
and st;.itcs that he is l11C.ling something because()( his body language.

I I .Lieutenant Liddiard klls defendant that he is ·•killing his integrity."

12.1.icutcnant Liddiard rq1L·atcdly rekr('nccd the .. tripping .. and .. dropping." statements ht: 111a(k

'"\ {'. . .~ -{ ti .. . ,

~J (i i, J_
f
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on the previous day with Sergeant Ludlow.

13.The Court finds that Defendant's interview wilh Lieutenant Liddiard~ at the police station.
was a custodial interrogation and that defendant did not feel free to leave.
14.l-lowevcr, the Court finds that there \vas an express waiver and that defendant voluntarily
waived his Miranda rights.

LEGAL (~ONCLUSION:
Defendant's Interview on .January 24, 2013

I. The Miranda warning was required lo be given by Lieutenant Liddiard
@

2. Based on the totality of the circumstances, the Court concludes that there was an express
waiver and that it was voluntary.
@
1.

The Court concludes that a one day separation, between the January 23 rd and 24 th
intcrvkv,:s, is a su fficicnt break bctwcl!n the unwarned statement and the subsequent warned
stah.:mcnt. pursuant to the ruling in .Hissouri ,·. Seihert. 5-42 U.S. 600 (2004 }.

I. Thcrcfort:. the Coun denies dclendant"s motion to suppress as to the third intcrrogatilln held
on .January 24. 20 I 4. \Vith Licutenant Liddiard. at the: police station.
@

ORDER

For the reasons stated ~il·hwc. the Court grants the de fend ant" s motion

®

lo

suppress statements made

bv., dt:lcndant durint!- his interviews on Januarv., IX. 20 I 3 and on .lanuarv- 23.2013. l-lowcvcr. the
Court denies tht: deft:ndant"s motion to suppress statements made during the interview· conducted on

@

F cbruary 05. 2015 04 ::38 PM
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January 24.2013.

Court seal and signature iocated at the top of page 1.

----------------------End of Order-------------------- ---

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby cenif) that on February 5, 2015, I caused to be delivered a copy of the foregoing /\mended
Proposed Findings of Facts~ Conclusions of Law and Order Granting Defendanfs Motion to
Suppress in Park and Denying the Motion in Part filed in the above-captioned matter to the
following parties via eiectronic maii:
1

Utah County Attorney"s Office
I00 East Center: Suite 2100
Provo. Utah 84606

/sf MICHAEL 13. NELSON
MICHAEL B. NELSON

PARALEGAL
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ADDENDUMC
Ruling and Order on State's Second Motion to Admit 404(b)
Evidence

@

@

@
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Piaintiff,

..

RULING AND ORDER
ON STATE'S SECOND iv1OTION
TO ADMIT RULE 404(b) EVIDE~CE

(;,.. ,
'iili:;I

Case No. 13140035 l

"

ROBBIE MACDONALD,
Judge Derek P. Pu !12..'1
Defendant.

Defendant Robbie MacDonaid is charged with one count of Chi Id Abuse, a second
degree felony. The State aliegcs th,it Defendant inflicted head trauma anci brnin clar,;,age upon his
girlfriend's I 0-rnonth old son ("Gabriel") on or about January 18, 20 l 3.
The State moved to admit Rule 404(b) evicJcncc including evidence that the Defendant
(I) yelled frequently at Gabriel; (2) called Gabriel a "whiner;" (3) called Gabriel a "spick;" (4)
"flipped off" Gabriel; and (5) was jc,tlous or the nttention Defendant's girl friend (Addie
Loveridge) paid to Gabriel.

::drnit evidence that tile Dcfcndc1~1t yelled 3l Gnbr!cl o.nd c:·dlcd hin1

!he State's motion

10

~! \\1 hinc.r.

··rhc (~oun. gr2nt~d

adrni: evidence that th<,; Dr.:fr:ncb1t cdlcd G2bricl a "spiel:," ;'flipped off'

J

'

.

.)

After further reflection, the Court vacated its ruling granting in part the State's motion.
The Cou..rt explained:
Use of the term "spick" and flipping someone off might not be words and actions
of sufficient contempt to motivate a person to violence. In analyzing tlus issue
the tiwjng and frequency with which these words and actions were used arc
significant factors in determining whether they are being offered for an improper
character purpose in violation of the Utah Rule of Evidence 404(b). Furttiermore:
the depL~ and frequency of expressions of jealousy, and whether or not those
sentiments changed over time are also important factors in determining whether
c\1 idence tl1at the Defendant i.vas jea1ot1s of t}1e ai1egeci '-·~ictim is }Jeing offered for
an improper character purpose.
(See, Order Vacating Prior Ruling, l li26/14).

Because Rule 4O4(b) evidence must be scrupulously examined: the Court scheduled the
State's motion for an evidentiary hearing. At the hearing, the Sta1e called only one witness,.Id:.-.
!.., Lr-vcr1·,i~c
v
U.::., f"r
\ 1~ ova-:do"'")
"-'~ L t:,"-'
•

A
l'•U

Having carefuiiy considered the evidence presented, the Court now enters the follo\l,'ing:

RULING
Findings of Fact
l. Loveridge met the Defendant in June or Juiy 2011. She introduced c;~briel to Defend~nt
in July :!012. Transcript of 1/20/15 Evidentic:ry J-h:aring ''TrDnscript,"

2

::11

6.

2. Loveridge brought Gabriel to Defendant's grandparent's home for "play datesn with the
Defendant's daughter (K.:vL). These play dates occurred almost ever; other day for the

next 4-5 months. Transcript, nt 7.
3. During thJs period of time, Defendant commented five or six times that Gabriel :'was
slown to develop-that he shouid be crawling and eating by now. Id. at i 0.

4. Loveridge no!.iced thm Defendant did not like to be touched by Gabriel and Ll-t2t he ,vou!d
not stop K.iv!. from pushing or hitting GQbriei. id. nt l 0- i 2.
5. L--1 late 2012, Loveridge and De fondant decided to move in together to L·work on being a
better family." id. at 58.
6. A mutual friend needed a roomma{c and so Loveridge and Defendant decided to move
into the basement of the friend's home. Tnis occurred during the first week of December
2012, six \Vccks before Ga bric! was injured. Id
7. At the time Loveridge and Defendant moved in togcther1 she \vns working on Fridays 1
Saturdays, '1nd Sundays for approxim2tc!y 20 hours per week. As Christmas
approached, Loveridge took t1d-..,antage of overtime: opportun:!ies v.nd worked 30 hours
per week. Defe:!d,rnt. w;:s not

j(:t

cr1rnlled in school .1.nci was home 80% of the time.

Defendant enrolled in school the \,'.·eek that Gabriel was injured. Id. :.1l 14- i 6.

3
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8. Loveridge testified that she went to San Diego, CaliforPja for Ch..ristrnr:s. She spent seven
days there and returned before New Year's Day. Transcript, at 17. A: the cvidentiary
hearing, the San Diego trip became a reference point for \vhcn events happened.

9. From the date Loveridge and the Defendant moved in together until Loveridge left for
San Diego, Defendant was with Gabriei every day. During this period:
a. Defrnd~t poked fun at Gabriel stating that "his eyes are crossed" ~rnd his ,:penis

is very small." Id. at 19.
b. Defendant would not stop K.M. from hit1ing Gabriel. Id. at 12.
c. The Defendant picked up Gabriel by the arms, carried him across the room, and

"plopped him down" on a bean bag chaiL Loveridge stated that this was ,:too
rough for my liking,, and that she knew it hurt Gabriel because he was crying.
Loveridge testified that this happened on several occasions, but two !imes be for~

she left for San Diego. id.

at

22.

d. Neither Gabriel nor K.M. w2s allowed in the bed that Loveridge ~nd Defendant
shared. Loveridge was required to breastfeed Gabriel in the c:1i !d's room. Id

:!t

27-28.

10. From the d3y that Loveridge returned from San Diego to J~~nuar:-' 18, ?.O 1J, Loveridge
.
. t l1c 10
,. II ow:ng:
.
\V1tncssed
4

a. About one week before Gabriel was injured, he had a cold and runny nose.
Loveridge nonnally administered the medicine to Gabriel. However, one time
she asked Ll-ie Defendant to do it. Thereafter, she observed bruises on both of
Gabriel's cheeks. When she asked about this, Defendant told her that Gabriel had
fallen on a toy. Transcript, at 35-36.
b. On January 13,2013, the couple got into a heated dispute. Before or during the
argument, Defendant f1ipped off' Gabriel with both hands. Loveridge witnessed
11

this through the reflection in a fish tank. This was a ldnd of "last straw,, for
Loveridge. Defendant confessed to her that he was addicted to marijuana.
Loveridge took the madjuana away. After the fight, Defendant agreed to be a

better dad. Id. at 46-49.
11. In the six \Veeks that Loveridge and the Defendant lived together, Loveridge witnessed

the following:
n. Defendant called Gabriel a ,:spick" no more than four times. Id. at 40.
b. \Vh.ile looking for a new place to live Loveridge and Defendant drove by a trail<;r
1

park. Defendant stated that ·~Gabriel wou!<l fit in there because [the trailer park]
is full of spicks, but the rest of us wouldn t." This occurred nfier Christmas and
1

aftei the Defendant signed up for schooi. id. at 43.

5

c. Defendant said ''Gabriel docs not fit in our family because he is brmvn." This
occurred one time aft~r Loveridge returned from San Diego. Id. at 44.
d. Defendant called Gabriel ''the Mexic'1n." Loveridge testified that this occurred
:,more than once for sure.,: Transcript, at 44-45.
! 2. Loveridge testified as to several examples of bnd parenting, including:
a. Defendant hnd left both chiidrcn unchanged resuiting in them being covered in

feces. Id. at 64.
b. Defendant would not feed Gabriel when he was hungry, or at least would feed

K.M. firsl. Id. at 25.
c. Defendant -..vouid yell excessively. id. at 53-54.
13. Loveridge testified

L}iat

Defendant was jealous of Gabriel because Defendant ( 1) did not

like Gabriel clinging to her; (2) encouraged her to leave the room and let Gabriel cry it
out; (3) would pull Gabriel awciy from her; ('1) encouraged Loveridge to get Gabriel's
father :o take him for parent timt!; and (5) wanted to }rnvc time '.Vith just her and K.i\,1. Id.
at

51-52.

14. Finally, Loveridge testified thm from the first week of December 20 l 2 through January

6
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Conclusions of Law

Three-Part Test to Determine !1dmissibili~y of Rule 1104(b) Evidence
Evidence of other crimes, \\Tangs or acts is not ndmissible to prove the cbclfacter of a
person ~n order to show action in confom1ity therewith. It may, however, be adraissiblc for other
pmposes, such as proof of motive~ opportunitr, i1~tent, preparation, plt1n: knowledge, identity, or
?.bsenc~ of mistake or accident. URE 404(b). The Utah S1iprr.me Cour; develori~d a three pan

~r:aiysis lo determine wh~thcr cv:dcncc is admissible under rule 40 1I(b).

S!ali: v.

l·./e!son-

Waggoner, 2000 UT 59, ~i<,i 17-20:
First, the court must determine if the br.:cl acts evidence is being offered for

i

proper, non-

ch2racter purpose, such as one of those specifical1y listed in rule 404(b). Second, the court must

detenniric wr1ethcr the b1d t1cts evidence meets the rcqll!rcments of ruic 402) which permits

admission of only relevant evidence. Third, the court must determine whether the bad 2.cts
evidence meet.s the requirements of rule 403, which excludes cvidc:1cc if :ts prob~!tiv!? vn!uc is
s;.ibsrnntinlly outwci ghed by the dnngcr of unfair prejudice, confosion of the issue, or mis!ec1ding

[he jury, o: by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or r:eed less prc~;cntation of
curnu!ati vc evidcnc:c.
!n d~tcrmining whether the bad acts evidence meets rule

,lQ]

rcquircm:.:nts, U!z!h cou:-ts

rnzy consider~ n~i:nber of foe tors, including those found in Shick!cs: ( l) the strcr:gth of the
evidence of ~he other oJd acts; (2) tht: similnr:tics bctw:::cn the c:imcs; (3) the int('.:-val of time
7

,,

·'"'
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·"-

L~ : J _;__ i.

·, i .~,

that has elcpsed between the crimes; (4) the need for the evidence; (5) the efficacy of alternative
proof; (6) the degree to which the evidence probably will rouse !he jury to ovcrm2stering

hostility. Srare v. Shick/es, 760 P.2d 291, 295-96 (Utah i 988).
The difficulty in applying rule 404(b) rises from the fact that evidence of prior bad acts
often wi 11 yield dual inferences. Srate v. Verdi!, 20 l 2 UT 60, 1! I6. Thus, when prior bnd nets
evidence is presented under rnie 404(b), the coun should carefully consider whether it is
genuinely being offered for a proper! non-character purpose, or whether it might actually be
cimcd ::it sustaining an ~rnproper inference of nctior. i:1 conformity with a person's bad character.

Id. at ~J 18. If the evidence sustains both a proper and an improper inference under rule 404(b),
rhc cmms shoL!!d also balance the

t'.VO

inferences against each other under rule 403 to determine

which purpose dominates. The bad net evidence should be excluded if its tendency to sustain a
proper inference is outweighed by its propensity for ar1 improper inference or for jury confusion

,':.bout its real purpose. id.
Rule 403 ruu! 1/re Slrickles Factors

While some of the fac~ors iai<l ou: in Shick!es may be hcipfol in assessing probative value
of the t:!v:dence in one:: context, ~hey may
q:

!·10:

32. It is the.:-cforc unneccss~!ry to!' ,::ot:r~s to

b(; helpf\d in 2.nothcr. State v. luccro 2014 UT 15,
1

(.'.\'f:lU~tc

each and every factor ~rnd balance them

wgcth,~r in making their c1sscssml::1l. id. .i.iiis is oc~Z!use courts arc bound by the test of Rule
••

03, ~nd not lirnit(!ci to the fr!ctors laid cu: in ShicJ:!es. Id.
(•

0

In Lucero, the State offered evidence of the mother's past child abuse in order to prove
modus operandi and subsequently identity. The court used only a few of the Shick/es factors to
reach its determination. The similarity of th:; injuries incre~sed their probative value. The baby
was injured in a similar way and by simibr means on both occasions. Id. at~ 33. Moreover, the

short interval of time within which the injuries occurred also increased L~eir prob2tive value.
The court found that Lhere '.Vas no risk of overmastering hostility becnuse the prior act '.Vas !amc
•

In

•

.':.

r

l

•

•

compa.'lson to me rnrni injury.
The court need not identify each of the Shick/es factors in its analysis as long as they

make a sufficient inquiry under Rule 403. Stale v. Thornton, 2014 UT App 265:

~

39. The trial

court met the scrupulous examinntion requirement ·•.vhcn it engaged in a three- or four-step
~n~lysis, or; the record, of the req .1ircrnents for ndmission of prior bad acts evider:ce. Lucero,
1

36-37. Failure to analyze each category

~

or bad acts separateiy does not compon \.Vii.h the court's

ob!igr:tion to scrupulously exa1~1ine 404(b) evidence. Thornton, at~ 42.
1vioreover, and touching on the State's 0rgumcnt of cont ex l in the instant case, \Vhcn the
ch~gcd crime and rhc p~ior Zicts are ccn.,ide,ed

?.:!rt

of a sir:gle criminJl episode, ti:e evidence is

inextricably intertwined and ,!Qtl(b) is not implicated. id. at~] 43. Prior acts thc1t provide
necessary cont~xt w und~rst2nd how the c:-im{;s occG:-rcd .1rc no;,: i10\ve,..-cr, "incxtricc1bly
i!:l:::rt\'.'!1:eC so z:s to put the evidence b(;yond the rc.:!ch

9

or liQ4(b).

Jd.

@

Finally, where the context of the evidence involves a doctrine of chances analysis, Verde
has displaced the Shick/es factors. Stare v. Labrum, 20 I 4 UT App 5, ~ 28. \I/hen addressing the
probative value of other acts evidence in cases not governed by the doctrine of chances, Shick/es
factors remain relevant to the extent they are useful. Id.
@

Ultimately, the court is not required to apply the Shick!es factors rigidly, but rather must
carefully \-Veigh the tendency of prior bad nets townrd proper and improper inferences in Lhe
context of the particular case and consider whatever factors are relevant to that analysis as it
scrupulously examines the evidence. Id.
Tire Prior Bad Act Evidence At Issue
@

Yelling at the Children
Evidence that the Defendant yelled at Gabriel and K.M. excessively is not offered for a
@

proper non-character purpose. Rather> it is offered to show that the Defendant wns an impatient
father and therefore more likely to have acted in nccordance with that bad character trait on
January 13, 2013.
For this reason, the Court denies the State's motion in Iimine to admit this evidence.
Calling Gabriel a W!tiner

This prior b~d act is offered for tile proper 11on-charttcter purpose of showing that the
Defendant had contempt for Gabriel. The Defendant's ill-feeling$ towards Gnbriei do make it
@

iO

more likely that he assaulted him. However, ca!Jing someone a "whind' docs not manifest the
kind of deep-seated contempt that would move a person to cause serious bodily injury. The

probative value of this stntement is paper-thin and is substantially outweighed by the improper
character purpose-th~t the Defendant is ~n impatient or bad father.

For these rec?sons; the Court denies the State's motion in Iir.iine to tldmit this evidence.
Usinr! Racial Slurs Tmn;;d Gab;iel

Calling Gabriel

<!

"spick," "the ?vfcxican," and :'brown" is offered for the proper non-

chc:n1cter purpose of proving that the Defendant hnd contempt for Gabriei. This is especially true
in light of Defendant's st3temcnts that Gobriel "does not fit in our family because he is brown"
and that Gabriel v:ould fit ~nto a trni!er purk "full of spicks,, while ' 1 the rest of us ,vould not."
Trcmscrfpr, at l3-tl-')
1

The feelings of the Defendant townrd Gabriel in the weeks before January 18, 2013, the

day Gabriel was injured, arc relevant to proving who injured Gabriel. Because the Defendant
viewed Gabriel as "the other''. -·ti stranger or interloper in the family Defendant wanted to have
with Lovcriclgc-Ddcnd~m

\V~!S

::..:ss like! y to e:•:crcise restrnint in caring for Gabriel.

Finai!y, the prcb~~ti\'C \'aiu~ of thc:;c sl,:.tcr.icn:s is high . .-:\.s explained, the statements
demonstrate a decp-sc~tcd view that G,~bric\ did not belong in the family. Dcfcndnnt made the
st2.:cmcnts in Loveridu.e >s pn:st.:11cc Jnd sh:: ihereforc i:as personal knowledge of them. ll1e
sti!;Cm·~nts are m~tde i!: ti1e \\·eek~; im:1:e(.::~:t'.:ly ptcc-;ding the day Gabriel w;:s injured.
lJ

1

State s need for the evidence is great. Gabriel was injured at a time when he was in the sole care
of Defendant. Alternative proof of Defendant's state of rr:ind in regard to Gabriel is limited. lt is
unlikely that these st:.iternents will rouse the jury to ovcrm'1stering hostility, because, like Lucero,
they are tame in comparison to the alleged abuse. The stZ!teme;its arc not offered to prove that
Defendant is n rncist-tha.t he hates all Hispnnics-bu 1• rnther to dcrnonstrntc tlrnt Gabriel w:1s the
person upon ·.vhom Deferid2nt' s contempt rested. A iimiting instn1ciionl if requested by the
defense, wouid be effective in mitigating any improper use of the evidence.
For these rcusons, the Court grants the State's i7':0lion to admii this evidence.
Flirmin g Off Gabriel

five cbys before Gabriel was injured> the Defendant-in the course of n heated argument
with Lovcridgc-:rngri\y (:flipped off" Gabriel with both :nnds.

This prior bad .1ct is offered for a proper non-charJcter pur~osc--to show that the
Defendant :1ad contcmDt for Gabriel. The Defendant's state of mind in relation to G:1brie! is
relevant. Ho1,vever the prob::tivc value of this evidence is thin. flipping someone off-while an
aggressive gesturc--docs not manifest an intent to kill or to do sc:·ious bodily injury. Moreover,

Loveridge t<S1.ir1cd ~h~u si1:.: s,!1.v Dcfe!1dwt do this through,: :-cf!cc:tion in~ fish :ank. Other

i2

{:-_ '~ - ~
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, ..:

u . .,~1.d s

prejudice is high. The improper character purpose-to show that Defendant is nn impatient
father or crude person-predominates.
For these reasons, the Court denies the State's motion in Emme to admit this evidence.

Jenlousv of Gabriel
Initially, the Court rn!cci that Defendant's "feeling of jealousy" is not a prior bad 2.ct
subject tc, Rule 404(b). Whiic this is tnic, the conclusion that Dcfon<lant was j<.:aious of Gabriel
constilutes the lay opinion of Loveridge. 1 Lay opinion must be "rationaliy based on the
wi.tncs:;'s perception" and "helpful ... to detennining a fact in issue." URE 7OI(a)(b).
Herc, Loveridge testified that Defendant was jealous of Gabriel because Defendant (I)
did no! like Gabriel dinging to her; (2) encouraged her to leave the room and !et Gabriel cry it
out; (3) would pull Gabriel away from her; (4) encouraged Loveridge to get Gabriel's father to
take him for parent time; and (5) wa.r1ted to have time with just her and K.M. Transcript, at 51-

52.

: Dd::ndn::t's own s!:?tcrn::r:t, if :,ny, tha! he was jc:!IOllS ofG~b;id is nm s,ibJt~! to Ru!c 70 I. Dcfcnd:mt has
r,t>rson2i kno•,v1~dgt: ::;f his O\YI: s~ate of 111in<l. A feeling ofjt:idou5y is not ~1 p:·iur iJc;d J.CL Thl: G•.:lc;nJ;.:,j1t u\'/!I
dcs•::ription of b?!; :;t~:tc of rnind ro-,.:,,itrd Cabrici in the ,vccks prcc~ding J;![Hli!.I y ! S, 7.0 i J is re !cvant. The prot:~ni·:c
1

~

\'Jl1-:c c:· D~!er:d~:.!:t':, j:?:dou~~., !.~ lln1it~rl by the dcgr~c to \vhich Dcfl:ndant :::xpcricnccd this fcc}!;:g. Tbe co:1tcnl of

;•2!rn.: ot't:ic statement. Tll': Colln bcks suff,cient ii:fom:ation to dc:c .. n:nc wi,cihcr the prnbJtivc v;duc ci this
evidence is substa:~ti,il 1y cut·,vcighc'.d by the d;:ingcr of unfoi, prejudice.

.
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While Lovcridge's opinion is rationally based on the facts she observed, her opinion is

not heipfui ~o determining a fact in iss~ic. Ti1e jcalo:...:sy she describes is not manifest in

WJ)'S th2!

would suggest a dccp-scc!tcd envy that would motivate Defendant to commit a violent act against
Gcbricl. Therefore, Loveridgc's opinion would not be helpful to the trier of foct.
For thjs re2son, the Court denies lhc: Defendant's motion in li:nirn.: to admit Loveridge's
lay opinion that Defenc2:1t wt1s jealous of Gabric!.
Plr rsicnl Treatment of Gabriel

There is now evidence in the record tlwt Defendant (I) m~y have bruised Gabriel's
cheeks when attempting to administer medicine to hirn; and (2) several times picked Gabriel up
by the arms in a rough manner, carried him ac:oss the room, and dropped him on a bean bag
chiir. Transcript, at 35-36, 22.

These acts are not being offered for a proper non-character purpose. At first glc:nce, Lrie
evidence appears to fit into the "abs~ncc of mistake or accident" box-a proper non-char2.cter
purpose under Rule 404(b). After c1ii, Defc:idJnt h2s assc:tcd that he accidcntly dropped Gabriel

However, a more careful analysis demonstrates the fallacy of this conclusion. The State
does not contend that Gabrie! was injured \Yhen Defendant intentionally dropped him. 2 bdccd, it
is the State's position that a foll from the height described by Defendant could not produce the
injuries Gabriel sustained. Thus, evidence that Defendant intentionally dropped Gabriel on prior
occasions is not relevant and therefore inadmissible.
There is evidence in the record on which a reasonable jury could find that Defendant
bruised Gabrici's cheeks while adrr.inistcring medicine to him. URE I 04(b). However, there
docs not appear to be a proper non-charncter purpose for this evidence. Even if then:. w2s, the
probative value of this evidence is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair orejudicc.
The evidence chat Defendant caused the bruising is circumstantial. There is little similarity
'Jet ween the mechanism of injury to Gabriel's cheeks and the mechanism of injury that ca1sd
(jabriei;s brain damage. Finaiiy, lhcr(: is a high risk thut the jury \'.'Ctl!d conclude thut ber:~11)~

Defendant injured Gabriel on one occasion, he is more likely to have injured him on Jant!ary 18.
This is the very purpose foibi<lden under Rule 404(a) and it clearly predominates.
For these ,e2sons, the Court denies the state's motion in liminc to admit evidence thJ.t
Defendant intentionally clroppcd Gabriel on prior occasions and injured Gabriel while

by i1nrnducin!; Jthcr inst<1:1ccs in which Dcrcnd.:mt intentionally dropped Gabriel.
15
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ORDER
(i)

For these reasons, the Court GRA.NTS the State's Second Motion to Aclrnit 404(0)
evidence in part, nnd D ENlES it in part.
@

Thls is the final order of the Court on this issue. No further action is necessary.

@

@

@

@
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